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Article
Social Perception of Forecasters: People See
Forecasts of Future Outcomes as Cues to
Forecasters’ Desires, Attitudes, and Identity
Olga Stavrova1
Abstract
While people’s forecasts of future outcomes are often guided by their preferences (“desirability bias”), it has not been explored
yet whether people infer others’ preferences from their forecasts. Across 3 experiments and overall 30 judgments, forecasters
who thought that a particular future outcome was likely (vs. unlikely) were perceived as having a stronger preference for this
outcome. Individuals were more likely to infer preferences from forecasts in the presence of cues facilitating internal attributions
and in case of outcomes characterized by an actual positive empirical association between desirability and likelihood judgments.
Finally, making future forecasts inconsistent (vs. consistent) with one’s stated preferences made observers doubt forecasters’
expressed preferences and identity. Overall, these findings suggest that social observers tend to interpret future forecasts as cues
to others’ identity, values, and attitudes.
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Every day, millions of people make forecasts about the future,
including stock prices, fashion trends, outcomes of sporting
events, and political elections. Sometimes, people’s forecasts
just reflect their desires (Krizan & Windschitl, 2009). Other
times, they do not. For example, people often make predic-
tions that are inconsistent with their preferred outcomes out
of defensive pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986) to avoid
tempting fate (Risen & Gilovich, 2008) or in a hope that their
forecasts will affect the involved actors’ behavior and prevent
the unwanted outcome. Are social observers sensitive to these
forecasting motivations or do they believe that others’ fore-
casts are merely a reflection of their preferences? The present
research was designed to answer this question. Specifically,
three studies examined whether future forecasts serve as a
basis for inferences about forecasters’ desires, preferences,
and, ultimately, identity.
Preference–Expectation Link in Social
Inferences
People tend to see positive or desirable events as more likely
than negative or undesirable events, a phenomenon referred
to as the desirability bias (or preference–expectation link;
Krizan & Windschitl, 2007; Weinstein, 1980). For example,
people overestimate the likelihood that positive, rather than
negative, events will happen to them (Lench & Ditto, 2008;
Weinstein, 1980). Individuals’ preferences for a certain event
have also been shown to affect their judgment of this event’s
likelihood in the domain of politics and sports—the finding that
goes back to the 1932 presidential election, in which the major-
ity of Roosevelt (vs. Hoover) supporters believed Roosevelt
(vs. Hoover) would win the election (Hayes, 1936). Since then,
the desirability bias has been documented with respect to dif-
ferent social, political, and sporting events (Krizan, Miller, &
Johar, 2010; Massey, Simmons, & Armor, 2011; Simmons &
Massey, 2012).
As people’s predictions of future outcomes seem to reflect
their preferences, do people infer others’ preferences from their
predictions? People routinely engage in inferring others’ men-
tal states—intentions, goals, and beliefs—from their behavior
and do so spontaneously and automatically (Hassin, Bargh, &
Uleman, 2002; Malle & Holbrook, 2012; Uleman, Saribay, &
Gonzalez, 2008; Van Overwalle, Van Duynslaeger, Coomans,
& Timmermans, 2012). In making social inferences, people
often tend to overestimate internal factors—attributes of the
individual—and discount external factors—attributes of the sit-
uation (i.e., lay dispositionism and fundamental attribution
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error; Ross, 1977; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). For example, people
are more likely to explain criminal activities by perpetrators’
bad character than by situational constraints (Kubota et al.,
2014) and even tend to attribute actors’ behavior in movies
to their personality (Tal-Or & Papirman, 2007).
At the same time, even when social observers on average
overestimate the role of internal factors in explaining others’
behavior, they rarely ignore situational forces altogether
(Reeder, Monroe, & Pryor, 2008). Similarly, people are less
likely to make internal attributions when cues to internal fac-
tors are weak or ambiguous. For example, a line of studies
on the fundamental attribution error showed that an attitudinal
essay did not serve as a basis for inferences about the author’s
underlying attitudes when it was of poor quality, as a poor qual-
ity essay represents a rather weak cue to its author’s actually
held attitude (Jones, Worchel, Goethals, & Grumet, 1971;
Miller & Rorer, 1982).
In the present research, I propose that people’s proneness to
consider outcomes’ desirability when judging their likelihood
and tendency to discount situational constraints when explain-
ing others’ behavior might shape their interpretation of other
people’s future forecasts. Specifically, individuals can prefer-
entially attribute others’ predictions of future outcomes to
internal factors, such as their desires and preferences. As a
result, they might end up drawing conclusions about targets’
preferences for future outcomes based on targets’ likelihood
judgment of these outcomes. For example, a person who makes
an optimistic election forecast for a certain party might be seen
as having a stronger preference for this party than a person who
makes a more pessimistic forecast.
These suggestions were tested in three experiments. Experi-
ment 1 examined whether a target’s likelihood judgment of a
new data protection law being enacted can serve as a basis for
inferences about his or her support for this law and political
identity. Experiment 2 tested the generalizability of this effect
across forecasts of economic, political, and social trends as
well as personal events, and explored its boundary conditions.
Experiment 3 examined whether group members who make
unfavorable (vs. favorable) predictions regarding their group’s
future are attributed the respective preferences and are per-
ceived as having a weaker group identity and commitment.
Study materials and data of all three experiments are publicly




Study 1 explored whether social observers tend to make infer-
ences about people’s preferences for future outcomes based on
their likelihood judgment of these outcomes in the context of
the Referendum on the new “Big Brother surveillance law”
in the Netherlands. The referendum was set to take place in
mid-March 2018, and the study was conducted several months
before this date. Participants read about a political forecaster
who predicted that the new law will versus will not enter into
force and were asked to estimate the forecaster’s support for the
new law and political ideology. I expected that a forecaster who
made an optimistic (vs. pessimistic) prediction about the law’s
passing chances would be attributed a stronger support for this
law. In addition, consistent with the differences between left-
wing and right-wing ideologies in the support of surveillance
policies (Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005), a more
optimistic (vs. pessimistic) forecaster will be perceived as
espousing a more right-wing ideology.
Method
Participants
Participants were first-year psychology students at a large
Dutch university who participated in the study for course
credits. The sample size was determined in advance by giving
potential participants a 2-week period to fill in the survey.
Based on the subject pool size, I expected to recruit at least
300 participants in 2 weeks, resulting in 80% power to detect
a small (e.g., d ¼ 0.30) effect (here and throughout the arti-
cle: independent sample t test, a ¼ .05, two-tailed). Three
hundred thirty nine participants completed the study. Forty-
three did not pass an attention check question (see below) and
were removed. The final sample consisted of 296 individuals
(Mage ¼ 19.92, SDage ¼ 2.20, 20.9% male).
Procedure
Participants read a brief paragraph introducing the Referendum
on the new “Big Brother surveillance law.” The planned law
will grant security services the power to more closely monitor
private individuals’ online behavior. Participants learned that if
the law is rejected by more than half of the votes cast, its entry
into force might be suspended. Next, participants read about
Paul van den Bos, a legal expert and political forecaster. In the
“negative forecast” condition, participants learned that Paul
“expected more than 50% of the votes to reject the Big Brother
surveillance law, so that it will not enter into force.” On the
opposite, in the “positive forecast” condition, participants
learned that Paul “expected less than 50% of the votes to reject
the Big Brother surveillance law, so that it will enter into for-
ce.” Next, participants indicated whether they thought that Paul
himself supported or opposed the new legislation (1¼ opposed,
9 ¼ supported), wanted the law to enter into force or to be sus-
pended (1 ¼ be suspended, 9 ¼ enter into force), and how he
would vote himself (1 ¼ against the law, 9 ¼ in favor of the
law). Participants’ responses to these three questions were
combined into a scale of perceived law preference (Cronbach’s
a ¼ .91). Afterward, participants indicated Paul’s perceived
political ideology (1 ¼ left, 9 ¼ right). At the end, participants
stated whether they themselves were in favor or against the law
(1 ¼ against the law, 9 ¼ in favor of the law) and whether they
planned to participate in the referendum (1¼ very unlikely, 9¼
very likely). As an attention check, participants indicated
whether Paul predicted more or less than 50% of the votes cast
to reject the law and responded to sociodemographic questions.
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Results and Discussion
Means, standard deviations (SDs), and correlations among all
variables are shown in Supplemental Table S1. Participants
believed that a political expert who predicted that the new law
would enter into force had a stronger preference for this law
(M ¼ 5.76, SD ¼ 1.81) than a political expert who predicted
that the new law would be suspended (M ¼ 3.64, SD ¼
1.48), t (294) ¼ 11.10, p < .001, d ¼ 1.30.
The forecast also served as a basis for inferences about the
forecaster’s political ideology in general. The expert who was
optimistic about the surveillance law’s prospects was seen as
tending toward the right-wing end of the ideological continuum
(M¼ 5.39, SD¼ 1.94) than the expert who expressed less opti-
mism regarding this law’s prospects (M ¼ 4.57, SD ¼ 1.66),
t (294) ¼ 3.92, p < .001, d ¼ 0.46.
Participants’ own attitudes toward the law and their willing-
ness to take part in the referendum were not affected by the
experimental manipulation (all ps < .32).
To summarize, a political forecaster who made an optimistic
(vs. pessimistic) prediction of a new law’s passing chances was
perceived as supporting this law more and endorsing the
respective political ideology. Hence, these results provide first
evidence of social observers’ tendency to make inferences
about people’s preferences based on the information about their
future forecasts.
Study 2
Study 1 has shown that people tend to infer others’ political
preferences and ideology from their likelihood judgment of
future political events. Study 2 sought to extend this effect to
a broader range of forecasts and explore its variability across
the forecasts of different outcomes. I examined two potential
sources of this hypothesized between-outcomes variability.
First, I assumed the tendency to infer others’ preferences
from their forecasts to be at least partially grounded in individ-
uals’ own tendency to see desirable events as more likely to
occur than undesirable events. Therefore, I expected the fore-
cast–preference link in the perception of others to be reflected
in the empirical forecast–preference association, that is, in
actual, empirical associations between individuals’ judgments
of outcomes’ likelihood and desirability. To examine this pos-
sibility, I tested whether the empirical forecast–preference
association with respect to an outcome (i.e., the association
between participants’ judgments of desirability and likelihood
of an outcome) moderated the effect of a target’s forecast of
this outcome on participants’ perception of this target’s prefer-
ence for this outcome.
Second, previous research has shown that people’s tendency
to make internal attributions collapses when cues to internal
factors are weak (Miller & Rorer, 1982). Therefore, I explored
whether individuals are more likely to infer preferences from
forecasts, when the information about a target’s forecast repre-
sents a strong (vs. weak) cue to his or her preferences. Future
events and outcomes naturally differ in the degree to which
they allow such inferences. Some outcomes are clearly desir-
able (e.g., finding a cure for cancer) or clearly undesirable
(e.g., natural catastrophes), whereas others are of mixed desir-
ability, that is, desirable for some people but not for others
(e.g., success of a certain political party or future fashion
trends). I expected participants to be especially likely to infer
forecasters’ preferences from their predictions in case of mixed
desirability outcomes (e.g., outcomes of political elections),
due to a great deal of ambiguity with respect to whether such
outcomes are desirable for any particular forecaster or not.
Under such circumstances, the information about a target’s
forecast might represent a cue to this target’s preferences. In
contrast, I expected the preference attribution effect to be
weaker or even vanish completely for forecasts of unambigu-
ously desirable or undesirable outcomes (e.g., finding a cure for
cancer), as such outcomes imply very little ambiguity with
respect to whether any particular forecaster finds them desir-
able or not, turning the information about his or her forecast
into a rather weak cue to his or her preferences.
Method
Participants. Participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk). Study 1 yielded a large (d ¼ 1.30) effect size.
However, as I expected this effect to get smaller for some
(e.g., highly desirable or undesirable) outcomes, to be able to
detect smaller effects (e.g., d ¼ 0.40) with 80% power, 201
individuals were recruited for this study. Three failed an atten-
tion check question (that requested them to select a particular
answer instead of answering the question), resulting in a final
sample of 198 individuals (Mage ¼ 37.73, SDage ¼ 13.58,
52% male).
Procedure. Participants read brief statements about 28 hypothe-
tical peoples’ predictions about the future.1 Half of the partici-
pants read that the target thought that an event will happen, and
the other half read that the target did not think that an event will
happen. For example, “Jessica thinks (vs. does not think) that it
will rain tomorrow” or “James thinks (vs. does not think) that
scientists will find a cure for cancer soon.” Different names
were used for each of 28 forecasters (the complete list of pre-
dictions is provided in Supplementary Materials). Whether the
target predicted an event or not was manipulated between sub-
jects. That is, for each participant, every forecaster was
described as either thinking that the event in question will
(vs. will not) happen. As a measure of perceived outcome pre-
ference, participants estimated whether the target wanted the
respective event to happen or not (1 ¼ not at all to 9 ¼ a lot).
Participants were additionally asked whether they them-
selves thought each of the 28 events will happen or not (likeli-
hood judgment) and whether they wanted the respective events
to happen (desirability judgment). Both questions were
answered on a 9-point scale (1 ¼ not at all, 9 ¼ a lot). Partici-
pants’ desirability judgments were averaged for each outcome
and used as an indicator of outcome desirability: The higher the
aggregate score, the more desirable the respective outcome was
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considered on average. To measure the empirical forecast–pre-
ference association, I computed a correlation between partici-
pants’ desirability and likelihood judgment of each outcome.
The correlation ranged between r ¼ .17, p < .05, and r ¼
.72, p < .001 (average r¼ .29). The higher the value of the cor-
relation, the stronger the empirical forecast–preference associ-
ation for each particular outcome.
The order in which participants judged the targets versus
indicated their own preferences and likelihood judgments was
counterbalanced. As the order did not interact with the experi-
mental condition (b ¼ 0.30, p ¼ .14), I’m not considering it in
the main analyses.
Results
On average across the outcomes, targets who considered a par-
ticular outcome as likely were attributed a stronger preference
for this outcome (M ¼ 4.92, SD ¼ 2.53) compared to targets
who thought this outcome to be unlikely (M ¼ 3.99, SD ¼
2.29). The difference between the conditions reached 0.93
points on average (d ¼ .52, 95% confidence interval, CI:
[.23, .80]), ranging between 0.51 (d ¼ -0.24, 95% CI
[.52, .05]) and 2.45 (d ¼ 1.36, 95% CI [1.05, 1.67]) points,
depending on the outcome (see Figure 1).
To account for the random sampling of both participants and
outcomes, I examined the effect of forecast on perceived pre-
ference in a multilevel regression analysis (Judd, Westfall, &
Kenny, 2012). The model included a random intercept at the
level of participants and outcomes. The experimental condition
was effect-coded (1 ¼ predicted, 1 ¼ did not predict) and
modeled as random at the level of outcomes. Supporting the
descriptive results reported above, these analyses showed that
targets who considered a particular outcome as likely were per-
ceived as having a stronger preference for this outcome
Figure 1. Effect of targets’ forecast on targets’ perceived preferences for predicted outcomes, Study 2.
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compared to targets who considered it to be unlikely (b¼ 0.93,
p < .001; see Model 1; Table 1).
Next, I examined whether this effect was moderated by the
empirical forecast–preference association (Model 2). The inter-
action effect between the experimental condition and the
empirical forecast–preference association was significant
(b ¼ 2.25, p < .001). Figure 2 shows the pattern of this interac-
tion by plotting the effect of targets’ forecast on perceived pre-
ference for each outcome as a function of the empirical
forecast–preference association. This figure shows that individ-
uals are more likely to infer preferences from forecasts of out-
comes characterized by a stronger (vs. weaker) actual empirical
association between desirability and likelihood judgments (r ¼
.80, N ¼ 28, p < .001).
To explore whether the effect of the experimental condition
on perceived preferences was stronger for mixed desirability
outcomes than for both highly desirable and highly undesir-
able outcomes, in the next step, I regressed perceived outcome
preference on the experimental condition, linear and quadratic
terms of outcome desirability and interactions of the
experimental condition with the linear and the quadratic term
of outcome desirability (Model 3). The effect of the condition
was qualified by a significant interaction with outcome
desirability (b ¼ 0.29, p < .001) and with its quadratic term
(b ¼ 0.12, p < .001).
The pattern of this interaction is shown in Figure 3. Parti-
cipants were more likely to infer targets’ preferences from
their forecasts of outcomes of mixed desirability (e.g., out-
comes of political elections) than of outcomes of low (e.g.,
a rise in income inequality) or high (e.g., eradication of inter-
national terrorism) desirability. Finally, as a robustness
check, I entered all predictors and interaction effects in
one model: Both interaction effects remained significant
(Model 4), suggesting that the two tested moderators are
independent of each other.
Table 1. Multilevel Regression Analysis on Perceived Preferences, Study 2.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Predictor b SE b SE b SE b SE
Fixed effects
Intercept 3.99*** 0.27 3.99*** 0.28 3.94*** 0.12 4.03*** 0.13
Condition (1 ¼ predicted, 1 ¼ did not predict) 0.93*** 0.18 0.93*** 0.13 1.49*** 0.18 1.18*** 0.17
Empirical forecast-preference association — — 0.46 1.01 — — 0.45 0.34
Condition  Empirical Forecast–Preference Association — — 2.25*** 0.39 — — 1.61*** 0.43
Outcome desirability — — — — 0.62*** 0.05 0.64*** 0.06
Outcome desirability2 — — — — 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Condition  Outcome Desirability — — — — 0.29*** 0.08 0.21** 0.07
Condition  Outcome Desirability2 — — — — 0.12*** 0.02 0.06* 0.02
Random effects (participants) Variance SD Variance SD Variance SD Variance SD
Intercept 0.42 0.65 0.43 0.66 0.70 0.84 0.67 0.82
Empirical forecast-preference association — — 1.09 1.05 — — 1.62 1.27
Outcome desirability — — — — 0.19 0.43 0.17 0.42
Outcome desirability2 — — — — 0.004 0.06 0.002 0.05
Random effects (outcomes) Variance SD Variance SD Variance SD Variance SD
Intercept 1.93 1.34 1.99 1.41 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27
Condition (1 ¼ predicted, 1 ¼ did not predict) 0.56 0.75 0.20 0.44 0.20 0.44 0.10 0.32
Note. Outcome desirability and empirical forecast-preference association were grand-mean centered.
***p < .001. **p < .01. *p < .05.
Figure 2. Perceived forecast–preference association (effect of fore-
cast on perceived preferences, Cohen’s d) as a function of the
empirical forecast–preference association (correlation between par-
ticipants’ desirability and likelihood judgment for each outcome),
Study 2.
Stavrova 5
As shown in Figure 3, participants were least likely to infer
targets’ preferences from their predictions of the outcomes that
most people find highly desirable or highly undesirable. To
make sure that this pattern is not due to floor or ceiling effects,
I conducted two additional analyses. First, I replicated the pres-
ent findings using Tobit regression—a method recommended
for outcome variables with floor and ceiling effects (Twisk &
Rijmen, 2009; Supplemental Table S1). Second, if the quadra-
tic effect of outcome desirability was simply a result of a lack
of variation in the perceived preferences for highly desirable
and undesirable outcomes, accounting for the extent of
between-outcomes variation in perceived preferences should
reduce this effect to nonsignificance. Therefore, I computed the
SD of perceived preferences for each outcome and included it
in the analyses as a control variable (Supplemental Table S2).
Both additional analyses replicated the results presented above,
suggesting that the potential floor and ceiling effects are
unlikely to explain the findings.
Discussion
Study 2 showed that individuals tend to infer others’ prefer-
ences from their likelihood judgment of a range of different
outcomes, including personal events and economic, political,
and social trends. Although this effect emerged with respect
to most predictions sampled in this study, some outcomes were
affected more than others. Additional analyses showed that the
perceived forecast–preference associations were related to
actual empirical associations between forecasts and prefer-
ences. Specifically, participants were more likely to infer
preferences from forecasts of outcomes characterized by a
stronger (vs. weaker) actual empirical association between
judgments of outcomes’ desirability and likelihood.
Also, consistent with the literature on lay dispositionism
(e.g., Miller & Rorer, 1982), participants’ tendency to infer
forecasters’ preferences from their predictions was moderated
by the strength of the cues to internal attributions. Specifically,
the forecast–preference link was stronger for mixed desirability
outcomes than for desirable or undesirable outcomes, as the
former involved much more ambiguity regarding any particular
forecaster’s preferences than the latter, turning the information
about his or her prediction into a relatively strong (vs. weak)
cue to his or her preferences.
Study 3
While the results of Studies 1 and 2 showed that people tend to
attribute others’ future forecasts to their preferences, real-life
forecasters often make predictions that don’t reflect their pre-
ferences at all. For example, Sosnik (2017), a prominent
member of the Democratic Party, has recently predicted
Donald Trump’s reelection in 2020 in the Washington Post
opinions section. People make preference-inconsistent
forecasts for multiple reasons, including defensive
pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986) or fear of tempting fate
(Risen & Gilovich, 2008). Can expressing such preference-
inconsistent forecasts make social observers doubt the fore-
casters’ preferences and group identification? For example,
will a target person who made a pessimistic (vs. optimistic)
forecast of a party’s winning chances in the upcoming elec-
tions be attributed a weaker desire for this party’s victory,
even when being explicitly described as this party’s sup-
porter? Study 3 was designed to answer this question.
Method
Participants. As the instructions included explicit information
about the target’s preferences, I expected the effect to be
smaller than in Study 1 (d ¼ 1.30) and Study 2 (on average
across outcomes, d ¼ 0.52) and set the minimum sample size
at N ¼ 200 (which would be enough to detect an effect of d
¼ 0.40 with 80% power). Two hundred twenty individuals
were recruited on MTurk. Twenty-eight did not pass an atten-
tion check question (see below) and were removed, resulting in
a final sample of 192 individuals (Mage¼ 35.69, SDage¼ 11.26,
63.0% male).
Procedure. Participants read about Jack who “lives in a small
Western European country and supports a certain political
party—party AC.” All participants also learned that “Jack
approves of his party’s program.” In the “predicted success”
condition, they further read that Jack estimated his party’s
“chances of winning the upcoming elections as very good.”
In the “predicted failure” condition, they read that Jack esti-
mated his party’s “chances of winning the upcoming elections
as very slim.” To measure perceived preferences, participants
Figure 3. Perceived forecast-preference association (effect of fore-
cast on perceived preferences, Cohen’s d) as a function of average
outcome desirability, Study 2.
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indicated how much they thought Jack wanted his party to win
the elections. They also rated Jack’s endorsement of his party’s
political program, his party’s values, his loyalty to this party,
his support of his party, and his identification with his party.
Participants’ responses were combined into a scale of per-
ceived party identification (Cronbach’s a ¼ .94). All responses
were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Par-
ticipants also indicated Jack’s willingness to vote for his party
and to participate in the elections altogether (1 ¼ very unlikely,
9 ¼ very likely) and were asked to indicate whether Jack esti-
mated his favorite party’s chances as very good or very slim
(used as an attention check) and responded to sociodemo-
graphic questions.
Results and Discussion
The descriptive statistics can be found in Supplemental Table
S2. Participants ascribed Jack a stronger desire for his party
to win the elections and believed that Jack identified himself
with his party more if Jack thought that the party’s chances
of winning were very good (desire: M¼ 7.99, SD¼ 0.99; iden-
tity: M ¼ 7.87, SD ¼ 1.00) versus very slim, desire: M ¼ 7.16,
SD ¼ 1.69, t (156) ¼ 4.14, p < .001, d ¼ 0.60; identity: M ¼
7.31, SD ¼ 1.28, t (190) ¼ 3.33, p ¼ .001, d ¼ 0.49.
Participants estimated Jack’s likelihood of voting for his
party as higher if Jack thought that his party’s chances of win-
ning were very good (M ¼ 8.59, SD ¼ 0.78) versus very slim
(M ¼ 7.84, SD ¼ 1.64), t (137) ¼ 4.09, p < .001, d ¼ 0.55.
Finally, participants also believed that Jack was more likely
to participate in the elections altogether, when he thought that
his party was likely (vs. unlikely) to win (M ¼ 8.38, SD ¼ 0.97
vs. M ¼ 7.59, SD ¼ 1.71), t (152) ¼ 3.95, p < .001, d ¼ 0.59.
To conclude, the mere act of forecasting an outcome shaped
observers’ perceptions of a forecaster’s preferences, even when
these preferences were explicitly stated in the instructions. Par-
ticipants attributed a political party’s supporter a weaker desire
for his party’s victory and a weaker identification and support
for his party in general, if he made a pessimistic forecast of his
party’s winning chances in the upcoming elections. In other
words, making predictions consistent versus inconsistent with
one’s stated preferences can have downstream consequences
for social perception, making others doubt one’s expressed pre-
ferences and identity.
General Discussion
The present studies showed that people use the information
about others’ forecasts of future outcomes to draw inferences
about their preferences. Across the forecasts of 30 different
outcomes, forecasters who described a particular future out-
come as very likely were perceived as desiring this outcome
more than forecasters who described it as very unlikely.
It is important to note that although on average across out-
comes individuals showed a significant tendency to infer oth-
ers’ preferences from their future forecasts, there was
substantial between-outcome variation. While individuals
readily inferred forecasters’ desires from some predictions
(e.g., outcomes of sporting contests, elections, new product
success, or weather forecasts), they were reluctant to do that
in other cases (e.g., rise in income inequality, eradication of
international terrorism). Consistent with previous research of
lay dispositionism (e.g., Miller & Rorer, 1982), individuals’
tendency to infer preferences from future forecasts was sub-
stantially stronger for mixed desirability outcomes than for out-
comes that most participants considered desirable or
undesirable. In addition, the between-outcome variation in the
effect of forecast on perceived preferences nearly perfectly cor-
responded to the between-outcome variation in the empirical
forecast–preference associations. Participants were more likely
to believe that forecasters’ preferences are reflected in their
forecasts in case of outcomes characterized by a strong (vs.
weak) empirical association between preferences and forecasts.
Although these results suggest that the desirability bias in
individuals’ own judgment and their perception of others
show a great deal of similarity, they also have one important
difference. Specifically, research on defensive pessimism and
“bracing for loss” showed that sometimes individuals make
predictions that contradict their preferences, demonstrating
a reversal of the desirability bias (Sweeny, Carroll, & Shep-
perd, 2006). Indeed, in Study 2, such a reversal was detected
with respect to predictions of the eradication of international
terrorism and a rise in income inequality: The more partici-
pants desired these outcomes, the less likely they considered
them. In contrast, a reversal of the preference–expectation
link never happened (or at least, never reached significance)
when asked to judge others’ preferences based on their predic-
tions (see Figure 1).
This is consistent with a common (Chambers, Epley,
Savitsky, & Windschitl, 2008), although contested (Vazire &
Mehl, 2008), idea that people might be better at introspection
than at understanding others. For example, individuals don’t
forget to take into account situational factors when explaining
their own behavior but routinely underestimate the role of the
situation and overestimate the role of personal characteristics
when explaining the behavior of others (Nisbett, Caputo,
Legant, & Marecek, 1973; but see Malle, 2006). Indeed, the
present results showed that, in the domain of politics, a party’s
supporter who expressed pessimism regarding his party’s suc-
cess was perceived as having a weaker party identification and
being less likely to support it by a vote than a more optimistic
supporter of this party. In other words, individuals appear to
doubt the political identity of a party’s proponent who
expresses doubt in his party’s winning chances. This finding
might be particularly important, as sometimes people make
pessimistic forecasts for the outcomes they deem particularly
desirable (Shepperd, Findley-Klein, Kwavnick, Walker, &
Perez, 2000). More generally, these findings also hint at a pos-
sibility that individuals’ desires and preferences can serve as a
signal to their identity, values, attitudes, and even future beha-
viors. Hence, people might use others’ forecasts of future out-
comes not only to infer forecasters’ preferences but other
aspects of identity as well.
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The present findings contribute to several research areas.
First, they extend the long-standing literature on the desirabil-
ity bias by showing that people don’t only let their preferences
guide their future forecasts but also use the information about
other people’s forecasts to make judgments about their prefer-
ences. Second, recent advice-taking literature has shown that
people generally prefer optimistic to pessimistic forecasters
(Stavrova & Evans, 2018). The present findings suggest that
people’s tendency to infer others’ preferences from their fore-
casts might underlie this effect and thus contribute to a small
but rapidly growing forecasting and advice-taking literature
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006).
Turning to practical implications, the inferences people
make from others’ predictions might have downstream conse-
quences for whom they befriend and maintain a professional
relationship with. For example, a political advisor making a
negative election forecast or a business analyst making a pes-
simistic earnings forecast might be considered disloyal and be
replaced. Finally, if forecasters are aware of the inferences
their clients make from their predictions, they might avoid
communicating pessimistic forecasts, which might damage
organizational performance in the long run (Morrison &
Milliken, 2000).
To conclude, trying to foresee the future is a tough task, and
it’s not surprising that people often let their preferences guide
their predictions. The present research showed that social
observers might be well aware of this and use the information
about others’ forecasts to draw inferences about their prefer-
ences. In other words, how people see the future might have
implications for how they are seen by others.
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Note
1. The study included additional nine statements about further targets
describing their beliefs in religious and supernatural phenomena (in
God, in Heaven, in psychokinesis, etc.). These statements are not
analyzed here, as they don’t represent future forecasts.
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